Multi-agent sandbox and tools
기준일: 2026-07-26
난이도: 중급
공식 기준: Multi-agent sandbox and tools
개요
이 페이지는 OpenClaw Multi-agent sandbox and tools 도구(파라미터, 권한, 설정, CLI)를 공식 문서 기준으로 정리합니다.
공식 요약: Per-agent sandbox + tool restrictions, precedence, and examples
도구 가시성은 profile / allow·deny policy / sandbox / channel 권한에 따라 달라집니다. 최신 스키마는 항상 공식 문서를 우선합니다.
공식 문서 기반 상세
아래는 공식 tools/multi-agent-sandbox-tools 문서를 정리한 내용입니다. 코드 블록, 파라미터 이름, 기본값은 원문 그대로입니다.
Each agent in a multi-agent setup can override the global sandbox and tool policy. This page covers per-agent configuration, precedence rules, and examples.
Backends and modes — full sandbox reference.
Debug "why is this blocked?"
Elevated exec for trusted senders.
Auth is scoped by agent: each agent has its own
agentDirauth store in~/.openclaw/agents/<agentId>/agent/openclaw-agent.sqlite. Never reuseagentDiracross agents. Agents can read through to the default/main agent's auth profiles when they do not have a local profile, but OAuth refresh tokens are not cloned into secondary agent stores. If you copy credentials manually, copy only portable staticapi_keyortokenprofiles.
Configuration examples
Example 1: Personal + restricted family agent
```json
{
"agents": {
"list": [
{
"id": "main",
"default": true,
"name": "Personal Assistant",
"workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
"sandbox": { "mode": "off" }
},
{
"id": "family",
"name": "Family Bot",
"workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-family",
"sandbox": {
"mode": "all",
"scope": "agent"
},
"tools": {
"allow": ["read", "message"],
"deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "process", "browser"],
"message": {
"crossContext": {
"allowWithinProvider": false,
"allowAcrossProviders": false
}
}
}
}
]
},
"bindings": [
{
"agentId": "family",
"match": {
"provider": "whatsapp",
"accountId": "*",
"peer": {
"kind": "group",
"id": "120363424282127706@g.us"
}
}
}
]
}
```
**Result:**
- `main` agent: runs on host, full tool access.
- `family` agent: runs in Docker (one container per agent), only `read` and current-conversation message sends.
Example 2: Work agent with shared sandbox
```json
{
"agents": {
"list": [
{
"id": "personal",
"workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-personal",
"sandbox": { "mode": "off" }
},
{
"id": "work",
"workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-work",
"sandbox": {
"mode": "all",
"scope": "shared",
"workspaceRoot": "/tmp/work-sandboxes"
},
"tools": {
"allow": ["read", "write", "apply_patch", "exec"],
"deny": ["browser", "gateway", "discord"]
}
}
]
}
}
```
Example 2b: Global coding profile + messaging-only agent
```json
{
"tools": { "profile": "coding" },
"agents": {
"list": [
{
"id": "support",
"tools": { "profile": "messaging", "allow": ["slack"] }
}
]
}
}
```
**Result:**
- default agents get coding tools.
- `support` agent is messaging-only (+ Slack tool).
Example 3: Different sandbox modes per agent
```json
{
"agents": {
"defaults": {
"sandbox": {
"mode": "non-main",
"scope": "session"
}
},
"list": [
{
"id": "main",
"workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
"sandbox": {
"mode": "off"
}
},
{
"id": "public",
"workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-public",
"sandbox": {
"mode": "all",
"scope": "agent"
},
"tools": {
"allow": ["read"],
"deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch"]
}
}
]
}
}
```
Configuration precedence
When both global (agents.defaults.*) and agent-specific (agents.entries.*.*) configs exist:
Sandbox config
Agent-specific settings override global:
agents.entries.*.sandbox.mode > agents.defaults.sandbox.mode
agents.entries.*.sandbox.scope > agents.defaults.sandbox.scope
agents.entries.*.sandbox.workspaceRoot > agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceRoot
agents.entries.*.sandbox.workspaceAccess > agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceAccess
agents.entries.*.sandbox.docker.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.*
agents.entries.*.sandbox.browser.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.browser.*
agents.entries.*.sandbox.prune.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.prune.*
agents.entries.*.sandbox.{docker,browser,prune}.*overridesagents.defaults.sandbox.{docker,browser,prune}.*for that agent (ignored when sandbox scope resolves to"shared").
Tool restrictions
The filtering order is:
Tool profile
`tools.profile` or `agents.entries.*.tools.profile`.
Provider tool profile
`tools.byProvider[provider].profile` or `agents.entries.*.tools.byProvider[provider].profile`.
Global tool policy
`tools.allow` / `tools.deny`.
Provider tool policy
`tools.byProvider[provider].allow/deny`.
Agent-specific tool policy
`agents.entries.*.tools.allow/deny`.
Agent provider policy
`agents.entries.*.tools.byProvider[provider].allow/deny`.
Sandbox tool policy
`tools.sandbox.tools` or `agents.entries.*.tools.sandbox.tools`.
Subagent tool policy
`tools.subagents.tools`, if applicable.
Precedence rules
- Each level can further restrict tools, but cannot grant back denied tools from earlier levels.
- If `agents.entries.*.tools.sandbox.tools` is set, it replaces `tools.sandbox.tools` for that agent.
- If `agents.entries.*.tools.profile` is set, it overrides `tools.profile` for that agent.
- Provider tool keys accept either `provider` (e.g. `google-antigravity`) or `provider/model` (e.g. `openai/gpt-5.4`).
Empty allowlist behavior
If any explicit allowlist in that chain leaves the run with no callable tools, OpenClaw stops before submitting the prompt to the model. This is intentional: an agent configured with a missing tool such as `agents.entries.*.tools.allow: ["query_db"]` should fail loudly until the plugin that registers `query_db` is enabled, not continue as a text-only agent.
Tool policies support group:* shorthands that expand to multiple tools. See Tool groups for the full list.
Per-agent elevated overrides (agents.entries.*.tools.elevated) can further restrict elevated exec for specific agents. See Elevated mode for details.
Migration from single agent
```json
{
"agents": {
"defaults": {
"workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
"sandbox": {
"mode": "non-main"
}
}
},
"tools": {
"sandbox": {
"tools": {
"allow": ["read", "write", "apply_patch", "exec"],
"deny": []
}
}
}
}
```
```json
{
"agents": {
"list": [
{
"id": "main",
"default": true,
"workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
"sandbox": { "mode": "off" }
}
]
}
}
```
Legacy
agents.defaults.*/agents.entries.*.*config keys (such assandbox.perSession,agentRuntime,embeddedPi) are migrated byopenclaw doctor; preferagents.defaults+agents.entriesgoing forward.
Tool restriction examples
```json
{
"tools": {
"allow": ["read"],
"deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "process"]
}
}
```
```json
{
"tools": {
"allow": ["read", "exec", "process"],
"deny": ["write", "edit", "apply_patch", "browser", "gateway"]
}
}
```
This policy disables OpenClaw filesystem tools, but
execis still a shell and can write files wherever the selected host or sandbox filesystem allows. For a read-only agent, denyexecandprocess, or combine shell access with sandbox filesystem controls such asagents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceAccess: "ro"or"none".
```json
{
"tools": {
"sessions": { "visibility": "tree" },
"allow": ["sessions_list", "sessions_send", "sessions_history", "session_status"],
"deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "read", "browser"]
}
}
```
`sessions_history` in this profile still returns a bounded, sanitized recall view rather than a raw transcript dump. Assistant recall strips thinking tags, `<relevant-memories>` scaffolding, plain-text tool-call XML payloads (including `<tool_call>...</tool_call>`, `<function_call>...</function_call>`, `<tool_calls>...</tool_calls>`, `<function_calls>...</function_calls>`, and truncated tool-call blocks), downgraded tool-call scaffolding, leaked ASCII/full-width model control tokens, and malformed MiniMax tool-call XML before redaction/truncation.
Common pitfall: "non-main"
agents.defaults.sandbox.mode: "non-main"checks the session key against the main session key (always"main";session.mainKeyis not user-configurable, and OpenClaw warns and ignores any other value), not the agent id. Group/channel sessions always get their own keys, so they are treated as non-main and will be sandboxed. If you want an agent to never sandbox, setagents.entries.*.sandbox.mode: "off".
Testing
After configuring multi-agent sandbox and tools:
Check agent resolution
```bash
openclaw agents list --bindings
```
Verify sandbox containers
```bash
docker ps --filter "name=openclaw-sbx-"
```
Test tool restrictions
- Send a message requiring restricted tools.
- Verify the agent cannot use denied tools.
Monitor logs
```bash
openclaw logs --follow | grep -E "routing|sandbox|tools"
```
문제 해결
Agent not sandboxed despite mode: 'all'
- Check if there's a global `agents.defaults.sandbox.mode` that overrides it.
- Agent-specific config takes precedence, so set `agents.entries.*.sandbox.mode: "all"`.
Tools still available despite deny list
- Check the [full filtering order](#tool-restrictions): profile → provider profile → global policy → provider policy → agent policy → agent provider policy → sandbox → subagent.
- Each level can only further restrict, not grant back.
- See [Sandbox vs tool policy vs elevated](https://docs.openclaw.ai/gateway/sandbox-vs-tool-policy-vs-elevated) for step-by-step debugging.
Container not isolated per agent
- Default `scope` is `"agent"` (one container per agent id).
- Set `scope: "session"` for one container per session, or `scope: "shared"` to reuse one container across agents.
관련 문서
- Elevated mode
- Multi-agent routing
- Sandbox configuration
- Sandbox vs tool policy vs elevated — debugging "why is this blocked?"
- Sandboxing — full sandbox reference (modes, scopes, backends, images)
- Session management
검증 체크리스트
- 해당 tool이 활성 profile/policy에서 허용되는지 확인
- sandbox / elevated / host 실행 경로 정책을 이해했는지 확인
- 채널·에이전트 권한과 충돌하지 않는지 확인
- 공식 CLI/
--help와 문서 옵션이 버전과 맞는지 확인